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Decisions by governments involving the funding and application of science 
and technology are increasing in complexity Paradoxically, there is an increasing 
demand for greater public participation in these decisions. There are a number of 
reasons for this: the recognition that science and technology can have 
far-reaching implications and consequences and may involve considerable risks, 
high costs, and ethical, moral and environmental considerations. Furthermore, 
there has been a growing distrust, or at least a questioning, of the authority and 
neutrality of science and the credibility and trustworthiness of scientific 
institutions. The establishment of the Australian Animal Health Laboratory with its 
long, and at times highly controversial history, reflects these changing attitudes 
towards science and technology, and scientists and scientific institutions 
The idea of establishing a laboratory for the diagnosis of exotic animal 
diseases arose in veterinary circles around 1960 Part One of this thesis traces the 
development of this idea, into a proposal to construct a maximum security animal 
health laboratory for diagnosis, research, training, and vaccine production and 
testing, to be administered by CSIRO, The control of the laboratory and the 
functions it was to perform became the subject of bureaucratic competition and 
territorialism, and the process of negotiation, bargaining and con.sensus formation 
continued until 1974 when the Parliamentary Public Works Committee Inquiry ^as 
held. This detailed account of the decision-making processes within the 
bureaucracy reveals the political, non-scientific basis for many of the argumenis 
and decisions. 
By way of contrast. Part Two looks at the public arguments presented to the 
I T T 
PWC justifying the need for the laboratory and the need for it to perform the 
various functions. The structure and procedures of the PWC limited participation, 
and the proceedings were dominated by the proponents of the scheme. 
Furthermore, the underlying assumption of the rational model of decision-making 
required that rational, scientific arguments be constructed to justify the proposal, 
with no suggestion of the uncertainties, value-judgements and political factors 
involved in the process 
Part Three examines the public controversy which erupted over the decision 
to import live Foot-and-Mouth Disease virus into the laboratory in advance of an 
outbreak. As the debate continued and the scientific basis of the decision to import 
the virus was called into question, doubts were raised about the need for the 
laboratory. These doubts, fuelled by opposing expert views, eventually called into 
question the decision-making process and the role of scientists and scientific 
institutions in decision-making and their authority credibility and 
trustworthiness 
Although not the initiators of the idea to establish the laboratory CSIRO 
played an important role in the decision-making process Once the strategic 
decision to establish this laboratory was taken, the issues were defined as ones 
requiring expert scientific consideration, and CSIRO was seen as having the 
necessary expertise This was accepted unquestioningly by ihe PWC However 
during the course of the pubtic debate, assumptions, value-judgements, 
uncertainties, and political motives underlying the decisions were exposed, and as a 
result, the authority, and credibility of CSIRO was undermined. The government's 
decision to ban the importation of iive FMD virus for at least five years against the 
recommendation of CSIRO, while defusing some of the conflict, further undermined 
CSIRO's authority. And it was not until the issue had been re-defmed as one for 
expert scientific consideration, with the formation of the fcnner Committee 
inquiry, that some of this lost authority was regained. 
I V 
This study documents the consensus and conflict, the negotiation and 
confrontation, and the post-hoc reconstruction of arguments, and reveals the 
complex and continual interplay between science and politics in the shaping of a 
major public decision. 
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PREFACE 
The decision to establish the Australian Animal Health Laboratory cannot be 
identified as a single decision taken at a particular time by a particular individual 
or group. Instead, its establishment was the product of many years of discussion 
and negotiation by a variety of actors representing several organisations and 
groups. The following study traces in detail this decision-making process. But 
while due attention is paid to all the actors involved, the main focus falls on CSIRO. 
There are several reasons for this: first, although the initiative to establish a 
maximum security animal health laboratory did not originate from CSIRO, the role 
played by CSIRO in the decision-making process became increasingly important. 
Second, CSIRO was at the centre of the controversy over the decision to import live 
FMD virus. Third, it was my intention to examine the way scientists and scientific 
institutions behave when involved in political decision-making. 
The task of detailing the activities of CSIRO and its individual scientists was 
made much easier because of its administrative organisation. CSIRO is made up of a 
number of Divisions, each with its own Chief. Each Chief communicates with the 
CSIRO Executive through a designated Executive member. Because the various 
laboratories are scattered throughout the country, much of this communication 
occurs by letter, and this provides valuable documentation. In contrast to this, 
government departments, such as the Department of Health and the Department of 
Primary Industry, which are centred in Canberra, leave little trace of the informal 
negotiating which occurs in corridors and over lunches. Furthermore, although 
each of these organisations has a single Head, the active involvement of the CSIRO 
Executive in decision-making provides an excellent source of information through 
Executive meeting minutes. 
I first became interested in the Australian Animal Health 
Laboratory around the middle of 1983, (when Barry Jones and the ASTEC Report 
began to catch the public's attention), and used it as a case study for the thesis 
component of my M.A. degree. This earlier minor thesis provided a basis and 
launching point for my PhD. thesis. However, whilst the subject of both theses is 
the same, the PhD. thesis differs from the M.A. thesis in the following respects: 
a) The M.A. thesis draws only on publicly available data, 
whereas the PhD. thesis uses a much wider range of archival sources and 
interviews, (see Bibliographical essay p.354.) 
b) The PhD, thesis provides a much more comprehensive 
historical account; it extends further backward to examine the origins of the idea 
to establish the laboratory, and further forwards to the public controversy and its 
resolution. 
c) The major focus of the M.A. thesis was on the PWC Inquiry: 
the PhD. thesis provides a new analysis of the PWC Inquiry, apart from the 
section on the cost-benefit analysis, the source of which is acknowledged. 
d) The PhD. thesis provides a much richer, multi-level analysis 
of the involvement of various organisations, groups and individual actors. 
1 " 
Tf you have built castles in the air, your work need not be 
lost; that is where they should be. Now put the foundations 
under them." 
Thoreau. 
Quoted by Mr J?.W.Ge«, then Director of the 
Bureau of Animal HeaKh, at the Victorian 
Veterinary Proceedinos. 1975. 
"Whether the money is approved by the Government or 
not seems to me to depend much more on the 
Government's confidence in the institution putting 
forward the plan and its understanding of the status and 
merit of those concerned." 
Sir Frederick White, Chairnvan CSIRO, 
March 1962. 
"I regret this has been a cautionary tale of government 
procrastination, political intrigue and scientific 
dishonesty , , " 
K. A.Ferguson, CSIRO Executive, 'The 
Australian Animal Health Laboratory: The 
Politics of Science and Agriculture". Annual 
CSR Lecture. Sydney University Chemical 
Society, November 1983. 
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